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Abstract A new type of monetary policy rule designed to achieve both price and output 
stability has increasingly been recommended during the last business cycle expansion, prior to 
the 2007 crisis. This type of rule implies “active” reaction functions. Based on the new Keynesian 
approach to monetary economics, these rules prescribe an active response by the central bank 
in the face of any shock that shifts prices or output from target, which leads to excessive money 
creation. Here, a less active type of reaction function is proposed; one in which price stability is 
the long run target, but permitting prices to respond to changes originating in real disturbances. 
It is argued that the resulting policy delivers outcomes preferable to currently popular rules.
© 2011 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Published by Elsevier España, S.L. All rights reserved.
Estabilidad de precios y estabilidad monetaria: una propuesta de una regla monetaria 
no activa
Resumen Durante la última etapa expansiva de la economía, previa a la crisis iniciada en 
2007, se propusieron nuevas reglas monetarias dirigidas a estabilizar tanto la infl ación como la 
actividad económica alrededor de ciertos objetivos. Este tipo de reglas implican la intervención 
frecuente en la economía a través de la aplicación de funciones de reacción activas. Basadas 
en modelos Neo-Keynesianos, estas funciones de reacción prescriben la intervención activa del 
banco central para corregir cualquier desviación de la infl ación y del output gap de sus objetivos, 
lo que conduce a un exceso de creación de liquidez en la economía. En su lugar, proponemos 
en este trabajo una función de reacción menos activa, que tenga un objetivo de estabilidad de 
precios a medio y largo plazo, pero que permita las variaciones de precios debidas a cambios 
en la productividad. Concluímos que este tipo de reglas menos activas conducen a mejores 
resultados que las funciones basadas en la conocida regla de Taylor.
© 2011 Asociación Cuadernos de Economía. Publicado por Elsevier España, S.L. Todos los derechos 
reservados.
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1. Introduction: activism vs. neutrality 
of monetary policy
In the 90s there has been a profound change in monetary 
policy research. Current research in this field is almost 
dominated by a new Keynesian approach to monetary 
policy that prescribes an active role for policy-makers 
in maintaining both (low) inflation and output stability. 
Central banks are told to follow a so-called “optimal” 
policy by correcting in advance any expected deviation of 
inflation from a target level and any expected deviation 
of output from a target (potential) level (that is, “fl exible 
infl ation targeting” [Svensson, 1999]). It is argued here that 
following this proposal could lead to an active policy with 
unwanted effects in the long term.
According to the new Keynesian model (Clarida et al., 
1999, and Galí, 2008), price rigidities in the short run make 
it possible to implement an active monetary policy with 
“persistent real effects” (Galí, 2000, p. 3). According to this 
model, monetary policy is able to affect the output gap and, 
thus infl ation expectations. As a result, the central bank is able 
to “fi ne tune” the economy while maintaining long run price 
stability as its primary target. Leaving important measurment 
diffi culties aside (related to the estimation of the “proper” or 
true output gap), the model is short term, designed to exploit 
those short run rigidities and thus permit the central bank to 
affect real output. This approach explicitly assigns a role to 
the central bank in stabilising the economy.
In contrast to shocks generated by the economy, 
the monetary shocks produced by the central bank in 
implementing that active policy are not easily monitored 
and evaluated by the market. They thus become a source of 
distortions that may affect relative prices and agents’ plans. 
As a result, those rules are a potential source of uncertainty 
that will affect resource allocation. 
In contrast, if a medium and long term perspective is 
adopted, different and non active policy prescriptions 
emerge. A truly neutral 1 monetary policy requires “not 
adding monetary disturbances to real ones” (Castañeda, 
2005, p. 61). As it will be explained below, at a more 
operational level this can be achieved by a policy oriented 
to maintain the purchasing power of money in the long run, 
while permitting short run price changes due to real shocks 
and innovations in markets. The type of policy rule we 
propose preserves the information given by relative price 
changes in dynamic and growing economies.
Furthermore, (Clarida et al., 1999, and Galí, 2008) new 
price and output gap stabilisation rules prescribe monetary 
policy changes in order to maintain a mild infl ation in the long 
run. However, nominal stability thus defi ned is not always 
a necessary target for real stability. In a notable paper, 
White (2006) emphasized that achieving price stability by 
targeting a consumer price index may not guarantee stable 
monetary and fi nancial markets in the long run. Developing 
the same line of argument, here we will focus on the 
implicit infl ationary trend of current price stabilising rules 
in the context of growing economies and open markets. 
In growing economies, such policy would require central 
bank intervention to counteract and offset price deviations 
coming from positive productivity shocks. Apart from the 
problem of measuring the true infl ation rate in the economy 
(see Bryan and Cecchetti, 1994, and Cecchetti and Groshen, 
2001), this policy implicitly generates an infl ationary trend 
with visible undesirable effects in the future (Buiter, 2006). 
This is why we argue that it is in the expansionary phase 
of the cycle when such price stabilisation rules allow for 
excessive money creation, thus distorting money growth 
(and possibly fi nancial markets) in long term basis.
To avoid unwanted effects in terms of output losses, 
we propose a policy rule that prescribes a different policy 
reaction in the face of different types of deflations; in 
particular, productivity-based deflations, associated with 
growing output and financial stability do not require any 
offsetting intervention. In fact, this type of fall of prices 
takes place everyday in the form of relative price changes 
and will be refl ected in the price level index depending on 
the weight of the sectors involved in that index. In sum, 
being aware of the potential instability and other real effects 
associated with the adoption of these new active rules in the 
context of a growing economy, we propose a different type 
of reaction functions that prescribe a less active policy rule.
The structure of the paper is as follows.
A different reaction function is proposed in section 
one; one by which a nominal income target will allow for 
different price targets depending on how productivity 
changes are transmitted to prices in the long run. This leads 
to the development of a generalised reaction function 
(GRF)). Since the adoption of a nominal income criterion 
takes account of the joint evolution of productivity and price 
changes, different price outcomes are possible: in a growing 
economy with markets tending towards competition in the 
long run, a nominal income criterion permits the adoption 
of a disinflationary, and even a mild deflationary target 
that matches, partially or totally, an increasing output. As a 
result, a less active monetary policy is needed; resulting in 
a more stable monetary policy.
In section two, analysis of recent monetary policy in the 
UK confi rms a general trend towards a more market-based 
and stable strategy. However, there inevitably remains a 
bias in the Bank of England strategy that prevents the full 
transmission of productivity changes into prices. As it will 
be shown, this bias produced an excess of liquidity in the 
UK economy during the business expansions that can be 
quantifi ed. That may distort market information and impede 
effi cient resource allocation.
Finally, we propose in section three minor changes in 
current strategy in order to implement a more neutral 
monetary policy in the UK and in other developed economies 
such as the eurozone.
2. Proposal of a new non active rule: 
generalised reaction function
Our proposal aims to follow two principles. First, in order 
to avoid monetary distortions in the markets, the central 
1. See Patinkin (1992) for a survey on the “neutrality of money”. 
There is a consensus on the defi nition of the neutrality of monetary 
policy when it only affects nominal variables in the long term. In 
this regard, our fi rst theoretical approximation to neutrality is more 
restrictive, since it requires not only long run conventional neutra-
lity, but also not affecting markets in the short term. However, this 
defi nition is less operational. We will come back to a more opera-
tional defi nition in later sections.
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target. So, money supply is set to “fi nance” the long term 
nominal economy growth and, if required, counteract short 
term cyclical deviations. Once a nominal income target is 
set for a pre-determined period (refl ecting expected long 
term output growth and the desired price target), the 
central bank will only counteract short term nominal income 
deviations from target if 2 > 0. As a result, if 2 = 0, we will 
have a truly passive or non reactive version of the rule.
In order to obtain a more operational expression, two 
different hypotheses are considered (eq. 2): firstly, the 
gradualism hypothesis, to avoid disruptive monetary 
decision setting (Clarida et al., 1998). And, secondly, 
asymmetrical reaction coeffi cients, which imply responses 
of different intensity to different nominal income deviations 
from target (in case 2 > 0) (Clarida and Gertler, 1997). 3
·M St = r 
·M St−1 + 11 − r2[1 ·Y *r,t+i + l1 ·Y *r,t+i 2e − ·VeT,t+i + l2 1 ·Ynom,t+i −  ·Ynom,t+j 2e]  (2)
Where:
r; Smoothing parameter, indicating the interest rate 
adjustment intensity to the desired value (0 ≤ r ≤ 1).
2 = ∫ 1 
·Ynom,t+j −  
·Ynom,t+i 2
e; 2 ≥ 0
Finally, by adopting the proposed reaction function 
in the form of a nominal income target we are not giving 
the central bank any role in stabilising real output. To the 
contrary, following this reaction function the central bank 
will adopt a price target explicitly related to the long term 
evolution of productivity.
2.1. Alternative generalised reaction functions: 
mild infl ationist, zero infl ationist, and mild 
defl ationist rules
Setting the long run nominal income target requires two 
elements. Once long term real output growth is estimated, 
the long term inflation target will depend on the value 
of parameter 1, and thus, on the central bank’s price 
stabilisation preferences.
If −1 < 1 < 0, productivity changes are partially 
transmitted to fi nal prices. This is a distinguishing feature 
of growing economies with highly competitive goods and 
services markets. So, the long run nominal income target 
will be the joint outcome of a growing economy and a long 
run mild defl ationary trend.
If 1 = 0, this situation corresponds to nominal income 
stabilisation, where economic and productivity growth 
are not followed by changes in prices. Using conventional 
reaction functions, this may be a special case of an intended 
zero-inflationist policy that offsets any productivity 
shocks affecting price stability (i.e. the so called “k %” or 
“Friedman rule”, Friedman, 1959).
If 0 < 1 < 1, the central bank adopts a “mild” infl ationary 
target 4, setting a positive lower limit of infl ation as a long 
term target.
bank should adopt a monetary target that allows for full 
market adjustments and the transmission of information 
in line with relative price changes. Second, in view of 
the lags in monetary policy, the central bank should set 
monetary policy and be evaluated on a long run basis. 
Consequently, monetary policy will be designed and 
implemented with a long term basis; as a result, nominal 
rigidities have time to erode and both relative prices and 
the price level will be able to refl ect changes coming from 
different real shocks.
In particular, in the face of positive productivity shocks in 
long term open markets, declining prices (either disinfl ation 
or mild deflation) will be the expected outcome in a 
growing economy. 2 In order to deal with different types of 
defl ations and, in particular, productivity-based defl ations, 
our monetary rule will permit a long run transmission of 
productivity changes into prices.
Instead of price and output gap stability, as part of a 
“fl exible infl ation targeting” rule, we argue for a nominal 
income target that refl ects the joint evolution of productivity 
and prices in the long run. Depending on the central bank’s 
preferences towards infl ation, this rule (eq. 1) will permit 
the adoption of different price targets that take into account 
the way productivity changes affect prices in the long run. 
For this reason, it will be considered as a generalisation of 
the existing functions - the “Generalised Reaction Function” 
(GRF, Castañeda, 2003).
·M St = 1  
·Y *r,t+i + l1 Pr odr,t+i 2
e − ·VeT,t+i + l2 1 
·Ynom,t+i −  
·Ynom,t+j 2
e  (1)
·M St = 1  
·Y *r,t+i + P*t+i 2
e − ·VeT,t+i + l2 1 
·Ynom,t+i −  
·Ynom,t+j 2
e
Where:
 ·M St ; Broad monetary aggregate growth rate.·Y*nom,t+i = 1 
·Y *r,t+i + l1 
·Y *r,t+i 2
e; Long term nominal income target.
·Y *r,t+i; Long term real output growth.
Pr odr,t+i; Long term real productivity growth.
1 ·Ynom,t+j 2
e = E 1 ·Ynom,t+j 2*t; Short term expected nominal income 
“j” periods ahead, with the information set available at 
“t”, where the monetary decision is made. So j < i.
 ·VeT,t+i ; Long term expected money velocity.
l1; Price stabilisation coefficient (−1 ≤ l1 ≤ 1): where 
price is not measured by a consumer price index, but by a 
general price index such as the economy defl ator.
l1 
·Y *r,t+i = P*t+i  ⇒ l1 = 
P*t+i
Pr odr,t+i
2; Short term activism coeffi cient: indicates the central 
bank reaction to short term expected nominal income 
deviations from target (2 ≥ 0).
According to this rule, the money supply is driven by two 
main components: a long term one, regarding the evolution 
of nominal income, and a short term one, regarding the 
expected deviations of nominal income from its long term 
3. In the empirical aplication to the UK monetary policy, we also 
extend the asymmetrical coefi cient hypothesis to 1. 
4. If l1 > 1, the price target is not set according to market expec-
tations; rather, central bank is fostering money supply as a policy 
instrument, following an output stabilisation criterion. 
2. “In the case of defl ation, declining costs due e.g., to technical 
change will lead to a declining price level as a result of an expansion 
of real output, without requiring any change in monetary growth or 
velocity. In other words, cost-push defl ation is compatible with the 
modern quantity theory” (Bordo and Schwartz, 1979, p. 19). See 
Castañeda and Wood (2011) for a more detailed explaination. 
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In sum, the value of 1 will depend on the infl ation target 
adopted by the central bank and, therefore, on the way 
productivity and economic growth are expected to affect 
prices in the long term.
Our GRF (eq. 2) allows for different central bank reactions 
in the face of different types of defl ationary pressures.
Adopting a low nominal income target will permit a (mild) 
downward price trend in the face of a growing supply of 
goods in the economy. Since this is an expected decline 
in prices, coming from a growing output, this is a kind of 
defl ation (“good defl ation”, Bordo and Filardo [2004]) that 
does not require any central bank offsetting intervention. 
If, on the contrary, defl ation is the signal of a general loss 
of confi dence and lack of activity in the economy, adopting 
our proposal permits the possibility of counteracting it. This 
leads to a less active monetary policy, with operational and 
theoretical advantages. Following Friedman’s monetary 
activism definition (Friedman, 1968), it requires less 
activism since it reduces central bank interventions during 
a pre-established time period. In view of the unavoidable 
lack of information about the “true” model of the economy, 
this more conservative policy will reduce the potential 
instability associated with a more active policy.
2.2. Concerns about defl ation
Due to the great concerns that were aroused by the 
1929 Crisis, and the recent long deflationary period in 
Japan, deflation remains associated with a recession 
scenario of high unemployment and great output losses. 5 
These are the main concerns regarding defl ations (Burdekin 
and Siklos, 2004):
—  Regarding monetary policy: fi rstly, defl ation reduces the 
effectiveness of monetary policy and, so, reduces central 
bank ability to develop countercyclical policies. Secondly, 
it may complicate the design and the understanding of 
monetary policy, since both central bank and agents are 
not used to a defl ationary environment.
—  Fisher’s debt-deflation theory, which identifies a 
correlation between growing agents’ debts, defl ationary 
trend and, fi nally, depression episodes. 6
—  The possibility that even a moderate defl ation rate may 
lead to a defl ationary self-reinforcing downward price 
spiral.
In proposing a rule that permits a mild deflation, we 
do not expect such unwanted effects. A mild deflation 
coming from productivity gains is totally different from a 
defl ation coming from a general loss of confi dence in the 
economy. Moreover, a mild productivity-based deflation 
is just the extension of a continuous disinfl ationary trend 
in competitive markets; a market phenomenon we have 
become more used to seeing recently as major components 
of price indices have fallen due to technical progress 
(sometimes overseas). This type of decline in prices, is not 
disruptive, and past experience shows that it can extend to 
a very wide range of prices.
Misunderstanding the foundations of different types 
of deflations was one of the most important factors in 
explaining the origin of price stabilising monetary policy 
rules (in the face of productivity shocks). Hayek (1928, 
p. 100) wrote: “Theory has hitherto scarcely progressed this 
distinction between the effects of changes in the price level 
originating on the one hand from the goods side and on the 
other from the money side. (…) The view advanced here, 
that changes in the price level coming from the goods side 
are not detrimental but are even necessary if disturbances 
of equilibrium are to be avoided, may still appear to many 
to have something of the air of paradox. (…) because the 
view that is dominant today, according to which only an 
invariable price level will ensure an undisturbed course 
of production, (…)” and it remains mainly a “paradox” 
nowadays.
However, recent historical studies have underlined the 
distinction, both in nature and consequences, between 
different types of deflations (Bordo et al., 2004; Bordo 
and Filardo, 2004, and Capie and Wood, 2004). Others, 
such as Atkeson and Kehoe (2004), find that there is no 
empirical correlation between deflation and depression. 
These analyses and findings support the distinction 
between different origins and consequences of defl ations 
and, therefore, the corresponding distinction between the 
optimal monetary policy required in each particular case.
Adopting a nominal income criterion through the GRF 
may generate a mild deflation in a growing economy, 
since productivity gains are, to an extent which depends 
on market structure, refl ected in prices in the long term. 
This type of defl ation is not a cause for concern. There are 
several reasons for this.
Firstly, a nominal income rule does not distort resource 
allocation. It does not prescribe continuous central bank 
interventions to offset defl ationary pressures that affect 
price settings and agents’ expectations; rather, it permits 
the heterogeneous transmission of the price signals in 
different markets. As a consequence, it preserves valuable 
market information for agents’ decision-making-process, 
and reduces the number of monetary shocks affecting 
agents’ expectations (Castañeda, 2005).
Secondly, most of the costs associated with defl ations are 
the consequences of demand-side defl ationary episodes. In 
this case, a signifi cant and persistent downward demand shift 
may lead to a general lost of confi dence 7 (Svensson, 2003) 
and, thus, to an “ugly defl ation” (Bordo and Filardo, 2004). 
But a mild defl ation coming from increases in productivity is 
the expected outcome in a fl exible and competitive market. 
In this case, a truly neutral policy should not react to offset 
that outcome, which is the ordinary and expected result 
5. “A mild but continuous defl ation could be a cause of concern, 
however, as it may increase economic uncertainties, distort resour-
ce allocation, entail distributional consequences, and lead to 
subpar growth performance”. Kumar et al. (2003, p. 3). 
6. See Capie and Wood (2004) for a more detailed analysis.
7. “Prolonged defl ation can have severe negative consequences. 
The real value of nominal debt rises, which may cause bankrupties 
(…). Commercial banks’ balance sheet deteriorate when collateral 
loses value and loans turn bad, and fi nancial instability may threa-
ten. Unemployment may rise, and if nominal wages are rigid 
downwards, defl ation means that real wages do not fall but increa-
se, further increasing unemployment. All this contribute to a fur-
ther fall in aggregate demand (…) and bring prices and economy 
down in a defl ationary spiral.” Svensson (2003, p. 2-3).
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in the market. Deflations are not inevitably linked with 
depressions and negative expectations.
Furthermore, increases in productivity will be followed 
by increases in the equilibrium real interest rate (Wicksell, 
1907, and Mises, 1912), keeping the economy away from 
the so-called zero bound of nominal interest rates and the 
ineffectiveness of monetary policy (or “liquidity trap”, 
Keynes, 1936).
Thirdly, some of the costs (mentioned above) that are 
said to be associated with defl ation are not consistent with 
a Rational Expectations Hypothesis. In fact, both agents 
and the central bank can learn how to analyse markets’ 
evolution in a mild defl ationary scenario in the context of a 
nominal income rule.
Finally, regarding the spiral effects of defl ations, Capie 
and Wood (2004) and Bordo and Filardo (2004) provide 
evidence which suggests that only in very specifi c and limited 
situations can deflation be linked to financial instability 
and depression (e.g. 1929). Furthermore, these situations 
were mainly determinated by a vast demand-side defl ation, 
following and followed by an inappropriate monetary policy, 
which undermined agents’ expectations about economic 
recovery (Svensson, 2003).
2.3. A more realistic, but not a mechanical, rule
Unlike the original Taylor Rule (Taylor, 1993a and 1993b), 
this reaction function (eqs. 1, 2) is set according to real time 
information availability. The central bank is supposed to make 
monetary decisions according to expected variables (the rule 
is forward looking), but using currently available indicators. 
So, monetary decisions are made in period “t”, with regard to 
medium term expected variables “t+i” periods ahead, using 
information of “t−z” periods behind. In this setting, the central 
bank has the possibility of using all relevant (and available) 
information to foresee medium term infl ation and output.
However, a reaction function cannot be used as a 
straightforward operational tool to run monetary policy 
(Blinder, 1998, and King, 2005), since personal judgements 
and other sources of relevant information play an important 
role in the monetary decision-making-process. The function 
is far from being a complete description of the monetary 
decision-making-process; rather it is a credible anchor to 
explain and communicate monetary policy decisions.
In this sense, the reaction function is just the final 
outcome of the monetary strategy of the central bank; 
which includes the definition of the central bank target, 
the hypotheses of the model (or rationale) used to analyse 
the economy indicators, the instruments used to implement 
policy decisions and, fi nally, its communication policy with 
the market. Consequently, the reaction function proposed 
is a way to explain policy decisions and the expected path 
of monetary policy, according to the model and information 
used by the central bank.
Finally, the GRF is the generalised expression of 
well-known money supply-based instrument rules 8:
If l1 = 0; l2 = 0, it is the fi xed (non reactive) rule proposed 
by Friedman (1959); which implies, by definition, the 
adoption of a zero infl ation target.
If l1 = 0; l2 > 0, it is McCallum’s nominal income rule 
(McCallum, 1987) It is an active rule, which adopts a price 
stability objective, and permits interventions to correct 
cyclical nominal income deviations from target.
If l1 = −1; l2 = 0, it is the fixed (non reactive) money 
supply rule proposed by Hayek (1928). Unlike Friedman’s 
proposal, a long term deflation target consistent with 
productivity growth is the target, not zero infl ation. 9
3. An empirical application: Is the Bank 
of England following an infl ationary rule?
Next we analyse the workings of our proposed rule during 
the last business cycle expansions in the UK data, using 
UK 10 from 1960 to 2004) (eq. 3). In this analysis, the 
evaluation of the parameter l1 will be our main objective: 
it can be considered as a “rough” measure of how central 
banks are reacting to price deviations coming from 
productivity changes and thus a measure of central bank 
price stabilisation preference. The changing value of this 
parameter will capture the Bank of England’s preferences: 
the bigger “l1”, the more activist is monetary policy.
·M St =  1 Trend  
·Y *r,t + l1 Trend Pr odr,t 2 − 
 Trend  ·VT,t + l2 1 Trend  
·Ynom,t − Trend  
·Ynom,t−1 2 
(3)
This GRF allows for testing different price target 
strategies (see Table 1 below), by using different nominal 
income targets (and thus, different “l1”). As a result, 
we will be able to compare the recent Bank of England 
monetary policy with ones coming from the adoption of 
those different targets 11:
If it has adopted a mild infl ationary policy, the central 
bank will have chosen an inflationary target in the long 
run, by which infl ation cannot fall under a certain positive 
value. So, under this target, in the case of a growing 
economy, prices may fall in the long run but only to certain 
limit; corresponding to that positive infl ation target. This 
corresponds to the adoption of a positive and greater than 
one “l1” (with a different value in the face of increasing 
(1.0) or decreasing (1.5) productivity growth).
If adopting a fully disinflationary policy, the central 
bank would have allowed prices to reflect changes in 
productivity. In the case of a growing economy, productivity 
9. For this reason, it has also been named as a productivity norm 
(Selgin, 1997). 
10. All the variables are Hodrick-Prescott trends of (interanual 
 variation rates):
—  Productivity: as output per worker for the whole economy (Offi ce 
of National Statistics).
—  Real GDP: Offi ce of National Statistics.
—  GDP Defl ator: Offi ce of National Statistics.
—  M4: As a proxy for broad money supply (Bank of England).
11. Since we focus on determining the infl ationary bias of monetary 
policy, the three GRF specifi cations are benchmarks to study the 
long term bias of monetary policy. As a result, all GRFs are 
calculated using trends and they are all non reactive reaction 
functions (l2 = 0, see eq. 3).
8. According to Svensson’s (1999) defi nitions, instrument rules are 
ad hoc functions that prescribe monetary policy according to 
predetermined variables. In contrast, optimal rules are the 
mathematical outcome of optimising an objective (or a loss) 
function, restricted to a set of equations that describe the economy.
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growth is transmitted in the long run to falling prices but, 
since this disinflationary policy avoids deflation, a lower 
infl ation bound is set at zero. So, in contrast to the “mild 
infl ationary” policy, a fully disinfl ationary policy permits 
disinfl ation until zero infl ation is achieved. This corresponds 
to the adoption of a positive and less than one “l1” (with a 
different value in the face of increasing (0.1) or decreasing 
(0.5) productivity growth).
If adopting a “mild defl ationary” policy, the central bank 
would have allowed prices fully to reflect productivity 
changes. In the case of a growing economy, productivity 
growth is transmitted in the long run to a falling price 
target. This corresponds to the adoption of a negative “l1” 
(with a different value in the face of increasing (−0.5) or 
decreasing (−0.1) productivity growth).
3.1. Underlying assumptions
We have tested three assumptions needed to asses the 
feasibility and usefulness of those GRF as tools to study UK 
monetary policy: First, since it is a money supply-based 
reaction function, we have tested the existence of a 
long run relationship between money growth and price 
changes. Secondly, adopting a forward looking rule such 
as the GRF requires the use either of expected variables 
or leading indicators. As it is a crucial variable for our 
GRF, we test if productivity is a good leading indicator 
of GDP. Finally, following our proposal, the price target is 
set according to productivity changes. So, we examine the 
joint evolution of those variables and test if prices follow 
different paths in the face of increases or decreases in 
productivity.
A. Infl ation as a monetary phenomenon
As it can be seen in Figure 1, money growth and infl ation 
have shared a common trend since the sixties, except for 
the period of the early eighties, a period characterised by 
signifi cant fi nancial deregulation and innovation. In order to 
analyse the cyclical evolution of money and prices in more 
detail, we have calculated the fi rst difference of the trends 
of the defl ator and M4 (see Figure 2). Using García Ferrer 
and Bujosa (2000) criterion to identify common cyclical 
patterns, the turning points of the fi rst difference of both 
trends may provide useful information about their cyclical 
evolution. Since the mid eighties, turning points of money 
growth (see Figure 2, points A, B, C and D) anticipate, 
several quarters ahead, turning points of prices (Figure 2, 
vertical lines). As a result, we can consider money growth as 
a leading indicator of price changes.
Figure 1 Prices and money supply in the UK. Data: Bank of 
England and National Statistics Offi ce.
Figure 2 Money supply and prices in the UK: long term leading 
indicator. All trends are calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott 
fi lter (HP). Data: Bank of England and National Statistics Offi ce.
Table 1 Generalised reaction functions: different policy options
 
Policy rules
1 = 
⎛   ⎞
⎝   ⎠
P
Pr od
2 Inertia parameter: 
 If  ↑ Prod. growth If  ↓ Prod. growth   
Mild infl ationist 1.0 1.5 0 0.9
Disinfl ationist 0.1 0.5 0 0.9
Mild defl ationist −0.5 −0.1 0 0.9
·M St = r  
·M St−1 + (1 − r)[Trend ( 
·Y *r,t + l1 Pr od *r,t) − Trend 
·Vt + l2 (Trend 
·Y *nom,t − 
·Ynom,t−1)]
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B. Productivity as a leading indicator of GDP
Using the same criterion, we have analysed GDP and 
productivity trends. As can be seen in Figure 3, turning 
points of productivity systematically lead turning points of 
GDP (see points A, B, C, D and E). This result is reinforced 
after analysing the first difference of the trends (see 
Figure 4). In this case, a clear leading pattern across the 
whole sample arises. This empirical analysis supports the 
adoption of productivity as a leading indicator of GDP.
C. Productivity and prices
The GDP defl ator in the UK follows a path associated with 
productivity changes since 1960. Though productivity 
growth has always been positive in this period of around 
fifty years, there are two different patterns: There are 
periods of increasing productivity growth (see A-B, C-D, 
Figure 5) and periods of decreasing productivity growth (see 
B-C, D-E, Figure 5). Prices vary in a different way in these 
two different productivity scenarios.
First, when productivity growth is increasing, inflation 
always falls. Secondly, when productivity growth is positive 
but falling, infl ation either increases (see B-C subperiod, 
Figure 5) or remains stable (subperiod D-E, Figure 5). 
In designing a GRF, this empirical result suggests the 
adoption of different price targets in the face of different 
productivity patterns; adopting an asymmetrical GRF, or 
a time changing “l1”. This inverse relationship between 
prices and productivity is confirmed after analysing the 
fi rst difference of both trends (see Figure 6): periods where 
the first difference of productivity decreases are almost 
Figure 3 Productivity as a leading indicator of GDP in the UK. 
All trends are calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott fi lter (HP). 
Data: National Statistics Offi ce.
Figure 4 Productivity changes: leading indicator of GDP 
changes in the UK. All trends are calculated using the 
Hodrick-Prescott fi lter (HP). Data: National Statistics Offi ce.
Figure 5  Prices and productivity trends in the UK: 
identification of changing points. All trends are calculated 
using the Hodrick-Prescott fi lter (HP). Data: National Statistics 
Offi ce.
Figure 6 Prices and productivity changes in the UK: 
identifi cation of changing points. All trends are calculated using 
the Hodrick-Prescott fi lter (HP). Data: National Statistics Offi ce.
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perfectly matched by periods of increases of the first 
difference of infl ation, and vice versa.
3.2. Main results
As Figure 7 shows, the three GRF specifications (mild 
inflationary, fully disinflationary and mild deflationary 
rules) prescribe increasing money supply growth in the 
face of falling productivity growth; and decreasing money 
supply growth in the face of increasing productivity growth. 
This is because in the case of an increase of productivity 
growth, the nominal income target is the joint result 
of growth of the economy and a fall of the price target: 
allowing for a certain disinfl ation, zero infl ation and a mild 
deflation (respectively). When productivity growth falls, 
inflation either falls (from 1983 to 1989) (but less than 
proportionally), or increases in all the cases from 1994 to 
2003 (see Figure 8).
Money supply growth in the UK, and thus infl ation, has 
been above the money supply growth implied by our mild 
infl ationist GRF for more than ten years (1980-1992). From 
1992 onwards, comparing to the three inflation targets 
proposed, the bias of UK monetary policy corresponds to 
the adoption of a mild infl ationary target (setting a positive 
inflation value as a bottom line, see Figures 8 and 9). 
However, taken 1997 as the beginning of the new monetary 
strategy of the Bank of England, the average growth of 
money supply in the UK from 1997 to 2004 (7 %) is close but 
even smaller than the resulting from the mild infl ationist 
rule specifi cation (7.6 %).
The adoption of a fully disinflationary target during 
these years would have permitted further falls of infl ation, 
in the presence of continuous productivity growth and a 
notably smaller growth of money supply. As Figure 7 and 
Table 2 show, from 1997 to 2004 the money supply in the 
UK has increased more than necessary to achieve strict 
price stability (more than 1 % points in excess on average). 
As a result, having adopted a mild infl ationary target as a 
baseline for monetary policy-making, the Bank of England 
has been increasing the money supply in the face of clear 
productivity growth during the last business expansion, thus 
implementing an inflation stabilising policy that creates 
infl ation.
Secondly, the conduct of monetary policy in the UK 
in recent years is consistent with a trend towards a 
more market-based monetary strategy; that is, one in 
which a price target is set not to achieve an output or 
Figure 7 Generalised reaction function: mild inflationist, 
disinfl ationist, mild defl ationist rules. All trends are calculated using 
the Hodrick-Prescott fi lter (HP). Data: M4 from the Bank of England. 
Shaded areas correspond to periods of increasing productivity 
growth. See Table 1 for equations and parameters used.
Figure 8 Alternative inflation targets: mild inflationary, 
disinfl ationary and mild defl ationary. All trends are calculated 
using the Hodrick-Prescott fi lter (HP). Shaded areas correspond 
to periods of increasing productivity growth. See Table 1 for 
equations and parameters used: P* = l1 × Trend Pr od
Figure 9 Analysis of recent UK infl ation target: identifi cation 
of a mild infl ationary bias. All trends are calculated using the 
Hodrick-Prescott fi lter (HP). Data: Offi ce of National Statistics. 
Shade areas correspond to periods of decreasing GDP growth. See 
Table 1 for equations and parameters used: P* = l1 × Trend Pr od
70 J.E. Castañeda, G.E. Wood
policy in the nineties (see Figure 10). In sum, monetary 
policy in the UK has converged to a more market-based 
strategy; by adopting a price target related to productivity 
changes that permits disinflation, but setting a positive 
infl ation target as a bottom line.
Finally, taking other money supply rules as benchmarks, 
the GRF is a generalised expression of other conventional 
money based rules; so, we have compared recent UK 
monetary policy to the ones resulting from these rules: 
specifically, McCallum’s, Friedman’s, and Hayek’s rules 
(see Table 3).The former is an active rule (l2 > 0) and the 
latter are non active rules (l2 = 0). They imply different 
price targets: strict price stabilisation in Friedman’s and 
McCallum’s rules (l1 = 0), and nominal income stabilisation 
in the Hayek’s rule (l1 = −1). We have also extended this 
analysis to compare the implications of a version of the 
Taylor rule. This is an infl ationist rule with more activism in 
reacting to cyclical deviations from target.
Following the same approach Taylor’s (2009) applies to 
explain the byas of the Fed during the last business cycle, 
we have also made several simulations regarding the Bank 
of England. If a strict price stabilisation policy, such as 
Friedman’s rule, had been adopted, money supply would 
have followed a different path in the UK:, money supply 
growth would have been slower; and, secondly, under this 
rule, the central bank does not have any scope to counteract 
short term deviations from target. As a result, there is a 
much smoother money supply growth in the sample (see 
Figure 11). Though since the early nineties, the gap between 
the Friedman’s rule and UK monetary policy has narrowed, 
the remaining divergence confi rms the adoption in the UK 
in the recent years of a price stabilisation policy around a 
mild positive infl ation target. This price stabilisation policy 
around a mild inflation target is better explained by the 
Taylor-based rule; however, on average, money growth in 
the UK in recent years (7 %) has been somewhat smaller than 
Figure 10 Evolution of UK monetary policy: towards a 
market-based policy. All trends are calculated using the 
Hodrick-Prescott fi lter (HP). Note: l1 = 
P*
Trend Pr od
⎛      ⎞
⎝     ⎠
Table 3 Conventional policy rules in terms of the GRF
  1 2 
Taylor-based rule
Trend  ·Yr + Trend Pr od − Trend 
·V + 
1.5(TrendRPIX − RPIX)|t−1 + 0.5(Trend  
·Yr − 
·Yr)|t−1
·M St = 0.9  
·M St−1 + 0.1 
⎡
⎢
⎣
1 − 0.9
Friedman rule
·M St = 0.9  
·M St−1 + 0.1  ⎡(Trend  
·Y *r + 0) − Trend 
·V ⎤⎣ ⎦ 0 0 0.9
McCallum rule
·M St = 0.9  
·M St−1 + 0.1  ⎡(Trend  
·Y *r + 0) − Trend 
·V + 0.5(Trend  ·Y *nom −  
·Y *nom)|t−1⎤⎣ ⎦ 0 0.5 0.9
Hayek rule
·M St = 0.9  
·M St−1 + 0.1  ⎡(Trend  
·Y *r  − Trend Pr od) − Trend 
·V⎤⎣ ⎦ −1 0 0.9
All trends are calculated using the Hodrick-Prescott fi lter (HP).
⎤
⎥
⎦
unemployment target, but rather to achieve monetary 
stability. Comparing the last two periods of falls of GDP 
growth in the UK prior to the 2007 crisis, (1987-1992 and 
1998-2003, see Figure 9, shaded areas), UK monetary policy 
followed a different path: in the fi rst one, highly infl uenced 
by the crisis of the ERM, a genuine inflationary pattern; 
and, in the second, the Bank of England has maintained 
infl ation around the target.
This general trend towards more stability is also refl ected 
in the changing value of parameter l1 in recent decades. 
From very high levels in the seventies (indicating a clear 
infl ationary policy), this parameter has been falling from the 
beginning of the eighties, approaching to a mild infl ationary 
Table 2 Average growth of money supply in the UK (1997-2004) coming from different policy options
Registered Infl ationist rules Disinfl ationist rules Defl ationist
M4 growth
Taylor
rule
GRF: 
Mild infl ationist
McCallum 
rule
Friedman
rule
GRF: 
Disinfl ationist
Hayek
rule
GRF: 
Mild defl ation
7.0 % 7.3 % 7.6 % 5.5 % 5.0 % 5.8 % 3.1 % 4.7 %
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that which would have resulted from the adoption of the 
Taylor based rule (see Table 2, 7.3 %).
Similarly, had Hayek’s rule been adopted, since under 
it long run price targets closely reflect increases of 
productivity, money supply growth would have been modest; 
permitting a long run mild deflationary trend associated 
with a growing economy.
4. Final remarks and policy implications
Since infl ation and defl ation are in the long run monetary 
phenomena, money-based monetary rules and reaction 
functions, such as the GRF, are useful tools to analyse 
and prescribe monetary policy. But not as mechanistic 
intervention tools, rather as benchmarks for long run 
monetary policy setting. In this vein, the proposed reaction 
function is not considered as an active tool to “manage” the 
economy, but as an important element of the communication 
of a market compatible monetary policy - one by which 
the central bank is able to explain the expected path of 
monetary decisions. Consequently, agents will have both 
reliable information and the rationale used by the central 
bank to set monetary policy on a long run basis.
Secondly, in contrast to the assumptions of the New 
Keynesian model and the optimal active rules associated 
with it (such as the forward-looking Taylor Rule), the 
running of the GRF does not prescribe an automatic 
reaction to any price deviation. The central bank will react 
only to monetary shocks affecting prices. As a result, real 
productivity shocks affecting markets will be allowed to 
have the expected impact on prices and will be compatible 
with maintaining the purchasing power of money in the long 
run. Further, since this rule sets the long run target in terms 
of nominal income, a growing output may be matched by 
disinfl ation or, even mild defl ation. As a result, it generates 
a less active monetary policy.
Finally, the Bank of England has successfully adopted 
in recent years a new monetary strategy, leading to quite 
low and stable infl ation. However, there is still an infl ation 
bias in the conduct of a mild infl ation-stabilising monetary 
policy. As we have seen, this bias has generated an excess of 
money supply growth (1-1.5 % pa) during the last UK business 
expansion, and thus an underlying monetary infl ation in the 
economy. If a fully disinfl ationary target were adopted in 
the las business expansion, genuine price stability would be 
achieved with smaller money growth and without generating 
frequent money supply shocks that may affect market 
expectations and resource allocation. This would be a minor 
change to current strategy and in line with its underlying 
statute, since that disinfl ationary target in the long term 
would be compatible with the mandate of preserving 
price stability. It would, however, require a change in the 
instruction given by the Chancellor to the Bank.
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